The New Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in Developing Countries: The Case of Turkey

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Abstract

The terms of the new public diplomacy and soft power are mostly argued through the experiences of the United States. However, the new (re)emerging powers like Turkey, Brazil, India, China, Mexico and Russia also favor soft power politics within their new understanding of public diplomacy to influence foreign public opinions. Therefore, this study aims to provide a country-specific evaluation through the investigation of public diplomacy and soft power in Turkey. Turkish Red Crescent is taken as the sample public diplomacy organization contributing to Turkey’s soft power. The study is guided by the following questions: What is the relation between public diplomacy and soft power? Is public diplomacy as a driving force for soft power really matter in international arena? What are the influences of culture, political values, foreign policies and domestic dynamics on Turkish soft power? What is the role of Turkish Red Crescent in contributing to Turkey’s image and soft power in the international arena? What are the challenges for Turkish public diplomacy institutions abroad? It is concluded that soft power mainly depends on several factors such as culture, political values, foreign policies and domestic dynamics. Therefore, countries which improve their socio-economic developments, share universal cultural and political values, implement liberal democratic reforms, and achieve stability are more successful in influencing foreign publics and intellectuals. In this sense, it is observed that soft power scores of Turkey fluctuate parallel to changes in these factors determining its soft power.

Keywords: Turkish Red Crescent, soft power, public diplomacy, humanitarian aid, international relations

1. INTRODUCTION
Traditional international relations discipline mostly deals with national interests, declarations, diplomatic initiatives, diplomatic memorandums, war and peace which were subjects between governments and international organizations. However, current governments seek to gain more
advantages in practicing their policies in their relations to other countries, so they aim to influence public opinion and intellectuals in these countries. In this sense, the terms like information, culture, dialog, language and communication to deal with complexity (Köylü & Önder, 2017) in international relations have become essential for the governments. Therefore, many governments are now included in an active process of creating a positive image by a ‘new public diplomacy’ which is a major tool for ‘soft power’ (Melissen, 2005; Huijgh and Walick, 2016; Nye, 2004). Parallel to these developments, global and country-specific studies on new public diplomacy and soft power have been increasing each day.

The terms of the new public diplomacy and soft power is mostly argued through the experiences of Western states such as the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom. However, the soft power issue has started to be popular also in other parts of the world. Particularly, the new (re)emerging powers like Turkey, Brazil, India, China, Mexico and Russia, because these countries have also started to have cooperative relations (Önder & Barış, 2017) and favor soft power politics within their public diplomacy depending on their culture, political values, foreign policies and domestic dynamics. Moreover, studies on public diplomacy and soft power should not only include the western view but it should also reflect the perspectives across the world. This way of analysis can provide a better global snapshot of public diplomacy and soft power. Accordingly, country-specific studies on public diplomacy and soft power in non-western countries are important for creating a global perspective.

The aim of this study is to provide a country-specific evaluation through the investigation of public diplomacy and soft power in Turkey. Turkish Red Crescent is taken as the sample public diplomacy organization contributing to Turkey’s soft power. In this direction, the study seeks international humanitarian activities of Turkish Red Crescent, because there is not enough number of specific studies on Turkish public diplomacy institutions in the literature. The study is guided by the following questions: What is the relation between public diplomacy and soft power? Is public diplomacy as a driving force for soft power really matter in international arena? What are the influences of culture, political values, foreign policies and domestic dynamics on Turkish soft power? What is the role of Turkish Red Crescent in contributing to Turkey’s image and soft power in the international arena? What are the challenges for Turkish public diplomacy institutions abroad?

In the light of the guiding questions, the study firstly defines public diplomacy and soft power, and then it discusses relations between them by questioning whether they are essential in foreign policies or not. In this part, the influence of culture, political values, foreign policies and domestic dynamics (like democratization process, stability and socio-economic developments) on Turkish soft power are observed by historical and developmental perspective. In this way, the influence of these factors on Turkish soft power can be understood better. It is also important to note that Turkey is thought to be a new emerging power in its region, and it is an interesting country to be evaluated for researchers, because it has quickly changing political, social and economic conditions. Although, it struggled due to social, economic and political crises until 2000s, its
rapidly growing economy, stability, global integration and democratization process since the beginning of 2000s attract the attentions like other emerging powers.

In the second part, it is argued that public diplomacy as a driving force for soft power is inevitable not only in developed countries but also in (re)emerging and developing powers. Therefore, public diplomacy organizations gained importance depending on their ability to create a positive image of their countries by international actions influencing publics and intellectuals in other countries. In this sense, this part of the study deals with the international activities of Turkish Red Crescent in the light of its contribution to the Turkish soft power. There are some other public diplomacy organizations contributing to Turkish soft power by their actions in the areas of cultural diplomacy, humanitarian aid, education and civil rights such as TİKA (The Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency), YTB (Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities) and Yunus Emre Foundation. The number of the studies on these organizations contributing to Turkish soft power is not at a satisfactory level. Therefore, single studies on these organizations can contribute to future research for soft power, and enhance related literature.

In the last part, it is concluded that public diplomacy as a driving force for soft power has become important for governments which seek to increase influence of their foreign policies, and gain more advantages in practicing their international activities. However, soft power mainly depends on several factors such as culture, political values, foreign policies and domestic dynamics. Therefore, countries which improve their socio-economic developments, share universal cultural and political values, implement liberal democratic reforms, and achieve stability are more successful in influencing foreign publics and intellectuals. In turn, this provides better chances for governments to practice their foreign policies, because they gain more advantages by soft power compared to others. In this sense, it is observed that soft power scores of Turkey fluctuate parallel to changes in the factors determining soft power. It is proved through a historical perspective on the socio-economic, political and cultural changes.

2. THE EVOLUTION OF TURKISH PUBLIC DIPLOMACY & SOFT POWER

11 September 2001 was a critical point for the public diplomacy firstly in the United States regarding its international relations, and then in other countries, because it showed the importance of communication and dialog with foreign publics (Melissen, 2005). In this sense, many countries are now implementing a 'new public diplomacy' as a driving force for 'soft power' which is thought to be necessary to create a positive image of their countries abroad (Huijgh and Warlick, 2016). Although soft power issues were firstly emerged in the United States to support its coercive and hard power (Melissen, 2005; Nye, 2004), (re)emerging and developing powers like Turkey, Brazil, China, and Russia have also started to use public diplomacy as a key element for their soft power, because they need to enlarge their impact area to sustain their development.

It is important to note that 'new public diplomacy' not only deals with relations between national and international diplomats, but also relations between diplomats and foreign publics. Like 'new public diplomacy', 'soft power' is also a result of a new understanding in international relations which was firstly mentioned in 'Bound to Lead' written by Joseph Nye (1990). Nye (2004) claims
that the sources of soft power of a country can be found in “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye, 2004:11). In other words, governments are now using their culture, political values and foreign policies as tools to shape the preferences of publics and intellectual people in other countries. It is also important to add that domestic dynamics like socio-economic developments, stability and democratization processes are also increasing the influence of soft power. In this sense, governments are now attaching more importance to communication, cultural interaction, dialog and cooperation with other countries to increase their advantages in following their policies.

2.1. Public Diplomacy

In the global world, public relations and communication have become very essential not only for the business world but also for the states in their foreign policies. New public relations defined as “the occupation held responsible for the ‘management’ or improvement of organizational relationships and reputation” (L’Etang, 2009:609), and it mainly reflects the understanding of business world. However, current governments also add public relations into their agenda because they are also involved in business relationships with other countries. Therefore, it became essential for governments to influence foreign publics by collaborating with media and establishing dialog.

Traditional public diplomacy refers to negotiation of issues, and a sense of understanding between governments (Art, 2009: 4; Gregory, 2005: 7). The definition of the term has changed many times during last decades. The new public diplomacy is generally known as governmental efforts to influence public and intellectual people in a country to gain advantages in its policies (Potter, 2002:3). The new public diplomacy, like public relations, also uses media and dialog in order to practice promotional and persuasive strategies (L’Etang, 2009: 610). Hans Tuch describes it as “…a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies” (Tuch, 1990:3). This type of a definition focuses on the dialog and communication with citizens and elected officials of other countries. However, Gifford D. Malone has a more specific understanding of public diplomacy, because he defines it as influencing “the behavior of a foreign government by influencing the attitudes of its citizens” (Malone, 1988:3). Therefore, he asserts that it is more important to influence the attitudes of citizens than the behavior of state officials. Finally, the definition made by Jan Melissen summarizes all the definitions above that “public diplomacy in its state-based ‘strategic’ guise is a more sophisticated variant of a well-established idea – namely that ‘public’ matter to governments as tools of national foreign policy” (Melissen, 2005:41). On the other hand, public diplomacy should not be limited to governmental organizations, because there are other types of organizations involving in public diplomacy activities such as “nations (stateless and otherwise), organizations, which operate globally (national sporting bodies, tourist bodies), global organizations (corporations such as Nike and nongovernmental organizations [NGOs] such as the International Olympic Committee, World Health Organization, and the Catholic Church), and international political organizations advocating change (Greenpeace)” (L’Etang, 2009: 610).
We need a new understanding of public diplomacy in the globalized world, because different types of organizations are now involved in public diplomacy to increase their advantages in relations to others. As Jan Melissen discusses, “The basic distinction between tradition diplomacy and public diplomacy is clear: the former is about the relationships between the representatives of states, or other international actors; whereas the latter targets the general public in foreign societies and more specific non-official groups, organizations and individuals” (Melissen, 2005:5). Considering that governments are not the only actors, they need to cooperate not only with its domestic partners but also international partners, because “openness and transnational cooperation” is needed for a successful public diplomacy (Cooper, 2003: 76). That means nonpolitical activities at domestic and international levels are also considered in the new public diplomacy.

Most of the time, public diplomacy is regarded as a type of propaganda which is defined as “the deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of an audience through transmission of ideas and values for the specific purpose, consciously designed to serve the interest of the propagandists and their political masters, either directly or indirectly” (Welch, 1999:24-26). As it is seen, the definition of propaganda is similar to definition of public diplomacy. Richard Holbrooke argues that public diplomacy is just a different form of propaganda because he tells that “Call it public diplomacy, call it public affairs, psychological warfare, if you really want to be blunt, propaganda” (Holbrooke, 2001). However, there are two key differences between propaganda and public diplomacy: historical baggage and the popular understanding of propaganda as manipulation and deceit of foreign publics (Melissen, 2005: 17). Firstly, it has negative references caused by Nazi and Soviet propaganda, Cold War conflicts and tactics because these types of propaganda mainly depended on coercion. Secondly, public diplomacy has positive connotations compared to propaganda because it depends on soft power. For instance, there are not so many people who call the public diplomacy of the European Union to encourage Turkey for implementing democratic reforms, strengthening civil society and focusing on the rule of law as propaganda. The term propaganda has a one-way messaging telling people what to do, while the public diplomacy depends on influencing and manipulating foreign publics by persuading them in practicing strategic targets. Furthermore, public diplomacy uses dialog as a liberal way of communication, because it considers what people also saying so it differs from propaganda. In addition, governments using public diplomacy as a significant tool need to consider the history, culture, psychology and language of foreign publics. In this sense, public diplomacy as a key element of soft power has become important for governments which seek to increase influence of their foreign policies, and gain more advantages in practicing their policies (Melissen, 2005; Huijgh and Warlick, 2016; Nye, 2004).

2.2. Soft Power

Jan Melissen (2005:48) argues that most empires ruled their territories and dependencies by domination rather than direct or full control, because military and hard power is necessary to build an empire while legitimacy, credibility, cultural superiority, and related normative dominance is possible by the application of soft power. However, ‘soft power’ was firstly conceptualized in the book ‘Bound to Lead’ written by Joseph Nye (1990) who introduced it as a
new understanding in international relations. His division between hard, or military, power and soft power increased the significance of the new public diplomacy. His explanations about the limitations of hard power, and advantages of soft power depend on culture, political values and foreign policy increased the role of public diplomacy (Melissen, 2005: 33). Hard power includes military and economic powers which rest on inducements (“carrots”) or threats (“sticks”), while soft power refers to getting outcomes without tangible threats or payoffs because some countries are followed and admired by others because of their values, level of prosperity and openness (Nye, 2004: 5). Hard and economic powers should be supported by the soft power, but excessive focus on hard power can corrupt the influence of soft power. If power is defined as the ability to get the outcomes one wants, soft power is “the ability to shape the preferences of others” and “ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence” (Nye, 2004:1-6).

We can talk about soft power if a country is persuaded to go along with purposes of another country without any explicit threat or exchange (by an observable but intangible attraction) (Nye, 2004: 7). Therefore, the Turkish case of membership negotiations with the European Union can be understood in this way. Turkish attempt to be a member does not depend on an explicit threat or coercion, but it is rather about admiring the attractions of European values like democracy, rule of law, prosperity and stability. Nye (2004:9) argues that hard power, which is based on brutal policies, can potentially undercut soft power because The Soviet Union once benefited from soft power, but its soft power was undercut due to invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. If a country has opportunity to contribute or shape international rules, it also has chances to increase its soft power. For instance, United States can shape international rules through international institutions (such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund) in direction of its interests, opinions and values so its actions are more likely to appear legitimate in the eyes of others.

Nye (2004:11) argues that there are three sources of soft power of a country: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)”. Firstly, soft power becomes significant and influential if a country’s culture includes universal values, so this country can get its desired outcomes easily. Media, for instance, is a good way of spreading culture for United States to other parts of the world, but it does not guarantee the outcomes in Islamic countries. On the other hand, Goethe Institut as a national institution of Federal Republic of Germany involves cultural activities by teaching the German language and culture in other countries, so it is a good way of spreading German values. Therefore, target countries show less resistance to interests and values of the countries practicing soft power. However, cultural diplomacy is sometimes thought to be too soft and peripheral to the real issues of policy, despite the fact that it is known as the main source of soft power (Melissen, 2005). Secondly, political values of the European Union (EU) such as democracy, rule of law, and human rights make it easier to get outcomes in Turkey. These values also affect the support of Turkish public for the membership to the European Union. However, the level of public support for the membership is upward and downward depending on political, social and economic conditions in Turkey and the EU, and crises between Turkey and the EU. Thirdly, foreign policies based on coercion and military
power decreases the influence of soft power, while policies like peace-keeping, humanitarian and economic aid increases the significance of soft power. Many foreign publics admire technology, music, movies and liberal democratic values of the United States, but the 2003 Iraq War corrupted soft power of the United States because many countries were objected to this war.

There are some limits to soft power according to Nye (2004:15-18). The first one is excessive dependence on hard, or military, power based on coercion and threat, because it can limit the influence of soft power. Secondly, soft power depends on the existence of willing interpreters and receivers. That means a government using soft power as a tool in foreign policies should find the receivers who approve these policies by their own will. Thirdly, soft power is more practical in democracies than autocracies because we cannot talk about influencing foreign public in an autocracy where the dictator is the only decision maker. For instance, Turkish Grant National Assembly did not permit the transport of American troops across the country in 2003 Iraq war, because the public opinion at that time was negative (less than 15 percent public support) for the actions of the United States (Nye, 2004: 57). Fourthly, soft power is more influential on specific goals than general goals of a country. For instance, if we consider Turkish national interests, the relevance of the soft power decreases, but if we talk about peace-keeping policy of Turkey between Israel and Palestine, soft power becomes more relevant. The fifth limitation is about governmental control of attraction which is significant in increasing the influence of soft power. For instance, democratic governments do not, and should not, control culture which is an essential source of soft power. The government should not also control the activities of non-governmental organizations and individuals which are also significant actors in the international relations. On the contrary, they should follow policies to strengthen their capacities to provide soft power rather than controlling. As a result, freedom in the area of culture and free action brings more attraction which is admired and followed by other countries. Finally, the changing results of opinion polls about soft power through time and space increase skepticism on the influence of soft power. Domestic and foreign public opinions fluctuate because they depend on annually, monthly or even daily policies of the decision makers. However, the influence of domestic and foreign public opinions is still significant for a country in practicing its public diplomacy as a key element of soft power, because public opinion has a more central place now.

2.3. The Phases of Turkey as an Emerging Power from a Developmental Perspective

Historically, Turkey has not attached great importance to public diplomacy in its foreign policies until 2000s. However, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, which has been ruling the country as single party since 2002, has implemented policies to increase transparency, accessibility, and openness in its foreign policies, so the influence of Turkish public diplomacy as a driving force for Turkish soft power has increased (Melissen, 2015:198). Turkey has a strategic geographical location between East and the West, but the reason why it is called as an emerging power mostly depends on its domestic dynamics (Erdoğan, 2010). Although, it struggled due to social, economic and political crises until 2000s, its rapidly growing economy, stability and democratization process since the beginning of 2000s attract the attentions like other emerging powers. This kind of a development made it necessary to increase public diplomacy as a driving force of soft power in order to get more advantages in practicing foreign policies. However, it is
still essential to make a short review of the development process of Turkey as an emerging and regional power.

2.3.1. First Years of the Young Republic
Turkey stands on a region, known as Anatolia, where the social, cultural, political and economic heritages of the Ottoman Empire and other civilizations exist. The establishment of Turkey as a republic, therefore, is a critical point, because the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, followed policies to make primary education free and compulsory, give women equal civil and political rights, transform Turkey into a secular nation-state, change the alphabet from Arabic to Latin alphabet, and he determined western living standards as the main target in order to bring prosperity to newly established Republic of Turkey (Huijgh and Warlick, 2016: 6).

2.3.2. The Period Between 1950s and 1970s
The history of Turkey was mainly shaped by tensions between liberal democracy and authoritarianism; civil administration and military coups/interventions; sustainability and economic crises; stability and political crises; social unity and separatist/ideological movements (Kurdish issue, cleavages between leftist and rightist groups); internationalization and nationalization. For instance, the country was ruled by a single party, the Republican People’s Party (RPP) established by Atatürk, for a long time, but the Democratic Party (DP) under the leadership of Adnan Menderes defeated RPP in the first multi-party elections in 1950. During the period of Menderes administration, Turkey gained full membership in NATO, and the Central Treaty Organization with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and UK was formed (Huijgh and Warlick, 2016: 6). However, this period was ended by a military coup in 1960, which resulted in the execution of Menderes and some other politicians. This military coup was followed by 1971 and 1980 military coups which established systematic and hegemonic control of military over politics, because military has placed itself as the ‘guardians’ of the state (Altundal, 2016: 12). On the other hand, Turkey faced political instability because of multi-party coalitions from 1970s until the beginning of 1980s, and many people died, imprisoned or injured because of social and political conflicts between leftist and rightist groups, so social and political coherence was heavily eroded (Ayhan et.al. 2016: 68). Moreover, economy became very fragile because of the domestic (military coups in 1960 and 1980, political and social divisions) and international problems (international oil and economic crises in 1970s).

2.3.3. Radical Changes During 1980s
24 January 1980 was a critical point for Turkey, because Turgut Özal and his team prepared the most radical reform for the Turkish economy in the republican history of the country. These reforms resulted in the establishment of the basis of free market economy, implementation of neo-liberal paradigm, acceleration of integration with the international economy, and reducing the role of the state in economy (Ayhan et.al. 2016). Although, Turkish economy has struggled during the adaptation process for these reforms, domestic and international support resulted in a positive expectation about the Turkish economy. Therefore, Motherland Party (ANAP) under the leadership of Özal won the elections as single party in the government in 1983, and it ruled the country until 1989 as single party government (Çavdar, 2013). In this period, for instance, the
trade turned from import-oriented to export-oriented, and amendments on ‘Encouragement of Foreign Investment Law’ (No. 6224) increased the role of private sector and entrepreneurship, and attracted foreign investment in the banking sector (Kepenek and Yentürk, 1996). On the other hand, the problem of current deficit was solved while revenues, foreign investment and export increased (Karabiçak, 2000: 56). However, these economic developments could not be supported by liberal democratic reforms, so long-term economic sustainability was interrupted especially after the fall of ANAP from the government in 1989 (Öniş, 2010).

2.3.4. Political and Economic Crises During 1990s
Turkey faced again economic, social and political struggles during 1990s, after economic success and political stability during single party government of ANAP. Turkey experienced political and social divisions due to multi-party coalitions after the fall of ANAP from the government. Moreover, Kurdish issue related to terrorist activities of PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and the level of import and public debt sharply increased. For instance, the increase of foreign debt increased from 41.751 billion dollar in 1989 to 67.356 billion dollar in 1993, and this resulted in 1994 economic crisis (Gökçe, 1995). Moreover, Turkish economy was affected by the South Eastern Asia crises in 1997 and Russian crisis in 1999 which influenced world trade and economy negatively (Karabiçak, 2000).

2.3.5. Turkey as an Emerging Power Since 2000s
The economic and political struggles have continued until the first years of 2000s, because political stability was still absent due to coalitions, and Turkey experienced economic crises in 2000 and 2001 which caused by domestic and international problems. Therefore, a new party, Justice and Development Party (AK Party), came into power as single party in 2002 elections, and it has been ruling the country since then. The period between 2002 and 2010 saw rapid growth, single digit inflation rate, political stability and deeper integration to international economy and organizations. Compared to previous center-right parties (like Democratic Party, Justice Party and Motherland Party), public support is still robust for AK Party, and the government is more durable due to economic growth and political stability (Öniş, 2010). As a result of democratization process, civil rule against the military, political stability, economic growth and reformist approach during AK Party rule, Turkey started membership negotiations with the European Union in 2005. Therefore, Turkey implemented radical legislation in order to reduce the role of the military in politics, while improving Turkey’s record on human rights issues (Nye: 2004: 92). For instance, criticism of the military in Turkey is thought to be an assault on Turkish Military Identity (Önder, 2010), but AK Party government changed this understanding. Furthermore, new policies and reforms provided 7% economic growth each year between 2002 and 2007; GDP increased from 3.492 dollar to 10.469 dollar between 2002 and 2011; and inflation decreased from 54.4% to 9.4% between 2001 and 2004 (Karagöl, 2013). In 2010s, Turkish economy was regarded as 16th largest economy in the world, and 6th largest economy in Europe in line with its increasing export exceeds 150 billion dollars (Purtaş, 2013:19).
The AK Party rule was firstly tested by online declaration of the military (also known as e-intervention) about the concerns about secularism and political struggle in the parliament, and then by 2008 global financial crisis. AK Party was able to cope with military intervention by the support of domestic and international support, especially the European Union, and the economy did not face a serious crisis after global financial crisis, because it was stronger and more durable due to AK Party reforms in banking and financial sectors (Öniş, 2010). AK Party won all national elections as single party in government (except from June 2015 elections), and it has always gained the majority in the local elections. Despite to successful economic performance of the country, many problems occurred after 2010. Firstly, economic growth has slow down, and terrorist activities of the separatist Kurdish group (PKK) increased. Secondly, the relations with the European Union have worsened because of the deceleration of democratization process and reforms, domestic law on anti-terrorism, and visa-free travel negotiations related to migrant crisis.

The political and social struggles in the neighboring countries like Syria, Iraq and Libya caused chaos in the region, so Turkey had to cope with increasing terrorist activities and international migration on its borders. In 2013, Gezi Parkı protests, concerning urban development plan on the green area of Taksim square in Istanbul, turned from green protests into a civil unrest due to harsh police reaction. Moreover, the government faced bribery operations in 17-25 December in the same year, so some of the ministers had to resign for the sake of court investigation on bribery, and avoiding from speculations. In addition to these crises in Turkey, many scholars argue that domestic policies of the AK Party government in terms of democratic rights, media censorship (incarcerations of journalists, social media restrictions etc.), police brutality (especially during the Gezi Park protests), authoritarian tendencies and re-establishment of hard power for terrorist activities in the eastern part of the country (as a response to PKK activities in cities where the majority of the residents are Kurdish), created a negative image of the country (Benhaim and Öktem, 2015:11-12; Huijgh and Warlick, 2016:30-33; Portland Survey, 2016). Finally, Turkey experienced a very serious failed coup attempt in 15th June 2016, and the Gülen movement, which was previously designated as terrorist organization by the government, was accused as the major planner for this attempt. However, the public showed a great resistance to armed military forces by going out and demonstrating the coup attempt on the streets, and critical areas like public squares, airports and public institutions. Since then, state of emergency continues until now, because government aims to prevent from future coup attempts, and it seeks to establish full civilian control on the state by arresting or suspending military officials, civilians and civil servants (police officers, judges, even teachers etc.) who actively or indirectly involved in the failed coup attempt.

### 2.4. Turkish Public Diplomacy and Soft Power

The ‘soft power’ issue firstly emerged in the context of American interests by Joseph S. Nye. However, the issues of public diplomacy as a driving force of soft power has become significant not only for the United States but also for the regional and (re)emerging powers such as Japan, the European Union, Russian, China, Brazil and Turkey. The Table 1 on different surveys about soft power shows that (re)emerging and regional powers are now more visible on the soft power
lists. For instance, ‘*Washington Consensus*’ was increased American attractiveness as a key component of soft power, however, it was challenged by the ‘*Beijing Consensus*’ which increased the attractiveness of China compared to the United States. Therefore, China has become more successful deployer of soft power than the United States, because other countries are now considering China as a better political partner (Melissen, 2005: 34).

### Table 1: Different Surveys on Soft Power between 2015 and 2018

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3 The information about the *Elcano’s Soft Power Survey in 2015* can be found at http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/f36b5f004830c24a8e3b8fe0dd72d861/Global_Presence_2015.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=f36b5f004830c24a8e3b8fe0dd72d861 (Accessed on 21.11.2018)

Comparing different surveys on the Table 1, it can be said that Russia’s re-emergence based on changing economic (energy sector), military (military operations abroad) and political performances (democracy and foreign policy) under the rule of Putin affect its place on the lists. According to Portland’s Survey on Soft Power in 2018, Russia’s focus on hard power strategies such as military operations in Syria started in June 2015, Crimea crisis with Ukraine, and Turkey’s downing of Russian warplane in November 2015 caused a reduction of Russian’s place in the soft power lists. These strategies resulted in political and economic problems, because Russia withdrew its political relations with the European Union, Turkey and Ukraine, and it faced economic sanctions and fall in foreign direct investment. Therefore, Russia’s economy shrinks by nearly 4% in 2015, and GDP is forecast to fall by a further 2% 2016 (McClory, 2018: 25-30). On the other hand, Russia’s economy is mainly based on energy sector, but falling oil prices is expected to reduce Russia’s global economic presence in energy as well as in other variables, such as investments (Olivié et.al. 2015: 46). In contrast, Russia’s deep reserves of cultural soft power continue through, for instance, Hermitage Museum, the Bolshoi Ballet, Chekov, Dostoyevsky, Malevich, Tchaikosvky, and Bulgakov (McClory, 2016: 44). As a result, it is clear that domestic dynamics and hard power in foreign policies have a direct influence on soft power.

Like other rising and (re)emerging powers, public diplomacy and soft power has become significant issues in Turkish agenda parallel to rapid growth of its economy, political stability, democratization and integration process with the European Union and other regions since 2000s. It has become obvious that public diplomacy has been acknowledged as a key element in Turkish foreign policy in order to increase Turkish soft power. Huijgh and Warlick (2016) claim that there are two main arguments about Turkish public diplomacy: “one conveys a new Turkish identity and highlights its economic prosperity and commitment to democracy; and another focuses on enhanced international credibility, which in turn reinforces Turkey’s regional leadership” (Huijgh and Warlick, 2016:14). Benhaim and Öktem (2016), for instance, argue that Turkish foreign policy has transformed into a direction of westernization and pro-active engagement with the world by the decision-makers of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and Turkish foreign policy elites. The “Zero Problems Policy with Neighbours” of AK Party and “Strategic Depth” of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu have become the main drivers of new foreign policy of Turkey. On the other hand, there was a negative attitude towards Israel in Turkish foreign policy, which in turn increased positive image of Prime Minister Erdoğan, who became President in 2015, in the Arab world; however, this image was corrupted after the collapse of diplomatic relations with Egypt and active involvement of Turkey in Syrian conflict. According to Monocle’s survey for 2014/2015, Turkey has the 26th place between 30 countries, while it has 14th place between 15 countries in Elcano’s survey for 2015. On the other hand, it seems that Turkey lost most of its soft power image until 2018 because Monocle’s and Portland’s surveys in 2018 show that Turkey has no place within 30 countries in terms of soft power.

Although there has been rise and fall in the Turkish soft power, Turkey is thought to be a ‘model country’ especially in its region depended on its domestic dynamics such as rapid growth, single digit inflation rate, political stability, democratization and deeper integration to global economy and international organizations (Huijgh and Warlick, 2016:15). Especially, after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Turkey has been regarded as a model of economic development, democratization, secularism and modernization for Islamic and Central Asian (Turkic republics) countries (Aydın 2003; Benhaim and Öktem, 2016:10). On the other hand, AK Party government created another target for Turkey: the leadership in the region. According to Huijgh and Warlick (2016), Turkey’s efforts to influence Turkic republics and Middle East prove that Turkey aims to get regional leadership because the AK Party government focused on increasing Turkey’s soft power. However, questions and skepticism has occurred about the foreign policy and democratization since the beginning of the 2010s, because some scholars argue that Turkish soft power lost its influence because of foreign policy failures and growing authoritarianism (Benhaim and Öktem, 2016:4; Huijgh and Warlick, 2016:30-33; Portland Survey, 2018).

Depending on the content analysis, Benhaim and Öktem (2016) argue that the academic publications (in Turkish and English) evaluating Turkish soft power on Google Scholar slowly increased between 2001 and 2005 (4 papers), but the number of published academic papers has sharply increased between 2005 and 2009 (41 papers), and reached 80 papers in 2013 (Benhaim and Öktem, 2016:5-6). It is interesting that Turkey aimed to follow active foreign policy in world politics after Ahmet Davutoğlu became Foreign Minister in 2009. In January 2010, the establishment of the “Office of Public Diplomacy” was announced by Prime Minister Erdoğan because the new government emphasized on the importance of public diplomacy as a key element to increase positive image of Turkey in international arena (Huijgh and Warlick, 2016:20). The main task of this office was to “provide cooperation and coordination between public agencies and non-governmental organization in their activities related to public diplomacy” (Huijgh and Warlick, 2016:20). In addition, the appointment of İbrahim Kalın to the Coordination Agency for Public Diplomacy (Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü) in 2011 also increased the attempts to promote Turkey’s image in international arena (Benhaim and Öktem, 2016: 6). İbrahim Kalın (2011), for instance, explains why government focuses on public diplomacy that “In order for us to achieve success and problems our country has long endured in the international arena, it is necessary to use public diplomacy tools and methods to inform accurately the international community” (Kalın, 2011:8). This explanation clearly show the new understanding of public diplomacy in foreign policy by the AK Party government, which mainly focus on influencing foreign publics by Turkish soft power.

Cultural diplomacy and humanitarian aid are the key elements of public diplomacy, because these elements make it easy to be in dialogue with foreign publics, while diplomatic communication necessitates too many procedures and formalities. Furthermore, new understanding of public diplomacy put great emphasis on culture, history, traditions and languages of foreign publics, so cultural diplomacy supports cultural exchange and communication between different publics. In addition to governmental organizations, the non-governmental organizations have gained great importance in Turkish foreign policy parallel to AK Party discourse on the culture and civilization during 2000s. Turkey has been practicing cultural diplomacy in some regions (such as Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia, Europe and Africa) for 20 years, where Turkey has common culture, history and geographic borders (Purtaş, 2013:2). Turkey, for instance, increased its relations with African countries during AK Party rule depending on historical ties of Ottoman
Empire (partly in North Africa) with the continent. As a result of these actions, the number of Turkish embassies in Africa increased from 13 to 39 between 2009 and 2016, while the number of African embassies in Turkey reached to 32 (African Business, 2016). On the other hand, people living abroad and sharing similar culture, language, nation and history are important for Turkish public diplomacy, but there are some cases in which these people cause disadvantages. For example, European public opinion is mainly shaped by Turkish population in European countries such as Germany, Australia, Denmark and France, so the issues of migration and integration corrupts Turkey’s image in these countries.

Cultural diplomacy activities have mostly carried by governmental and non-governmental institutions, and instruments such as business man, educational institutions, investments, humanitarian aid and technical support. These activities introduced Turkish culture, history and values to foreign countries, and this contributes to Turkish public diplomacy as a driving force for soft power. The Yunus Emre Foundation, TiKA (The Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency), YTB (Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities), TRC (Turkish Red Crescent) and even Turkish Airlines (selected as the top Airlines in Europe since 2010s with several destinations in the world) are the most influential public diplomacy institutions in the area of cultural diplomacy and humanitarian aid. However, there are also other types of public diplomacy instruments contributing to cultural diplomacy such as film festivals (Vienna Festival etc.), world fair organizations (Expo İzmir, Expo Antalya etc.), television and the arts (Turkish Dramas and soap operas), and Turkish TV series, tourism, and higher education (universities, research centers etc.) (Huijgh and Warlick, 2016:23-26).

It is important to note that public diplomacy institutions are government-affiliated whose policies are mainly affected by the government interests; however, other types of public diplomacy instruments are mainly non-governmental so their influence is mostly without governmental control. In a globalized world, this type of instruments became very essential by the increasing interaction between different cultures and societies through communication technologies. For instance, Turkish series on Arab channels is a new way of cultural exchange because Arab societies are influenced by the Turkish values such as romantic relations, lifestyle, modernism, history and gender equality. These values create a liberal image of the country on the eyes of many Arabs (Portland Survey, 2016). On the other hand, the role of public institutions providing humanitarian aid (like TiKA and TRC) should not be neglected, because their efforts are very important for Turkish public diplomacy in Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia. For example, TiKA’s actions has sharply increased during AK Party rule, because TiKA completed 2241 projects between 1992 and 2002, while it finished 1412 projects in only one year, in 2012 (Pürtaş, 2013:7). In addition, Turkey’s spending in official aid has increased from 73 million dollars to 3.3 billion dollars between 2002 and 2013 in the areas like agricultural training, Turkology departments, humanitarian aid, public infrastructures etc. (Huijgh and Warlick, 2016: 25). As a result, the activities of governmental or non-governmental organizations, and instruments contribute to Turkish soft power which in turn increases the leadership of Turkey in the target regions.

3. TURKISH RED CRESCENT AS A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ORGANIZATION
Public diplomacy as a driving force for soft power is inevitable not only in developed countries but also in new emerging and developing powers. Therefore, public diplomacy organizations and instruments gained importance depending on their ability to create a positive image of the country in the international arena. In this sense, it is necessary to evaluate international activities of Turkish Red Crescent in the light of its contribution to the Turkish soft power.

The development of Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) depends on the changing dynamics through the history from Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic. According to information on its website, this organization was firstly founded in 1868 as “Society for Aiding the Wounded and Ailing Ottoman Soldiers”, later it has several names such as “Ottoman Red Crescent Society” (The Benefit Society for Ottoman Hilali Ahmer) in 1877, “Turkey’s Red Crescent Community” in 1923 (the creation of the Turkish Republic), and “Turkish Red Crescent Community” in 1935. Finally, it has become “Turkish Red Crescent” since 1947. TRC has taken active roles from 1876 Ottoman-Russian war until today, and it provided humanitarian aid, social service and medical treatment for Turkish soldiers (including enemies) who are in need of help without discrimination during this period. In history, TRC have also involved in activities to care and protect civilians who are in need of humanitarian aid, social service and medical treatment due to epidemics, natural disasters and all kinds of conflicts not only on domestic borders but also in international arena.

TRC is a non-governmental organization based on non-profit, voluntary and social service, and it is one of the founder members of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). There are some arguments whether TRC is governmental or not. For instance, Hatipoğlu (2013) discusses that TRC can be considered as half governmental and half non-governmental, because it has a special place in Turkish politics as one of the oldest organizations seeking public interest in Turkey. He claims that TRC fulfills the gap between actions of business organization and government who seeks public interest (Hatipoğlu, 2013:185). In other words, organizations like TRC not only act as business organization but they also seek public interest parallel to government’s policies. Furthermore, its capacity to cooperate with international organizations in the areas of humanitarian aid, education, health and social services, provided a prestigious place for TRC compared to other non-governmental organizations. In this sense, it has a great influence in leading directions of international Red Cross and Crescent activities in responding political and social crises, national and international disasters, and food crises etc.

TRC has principles such as impartiality, humanity, non-discrimination, independence, charity, volunteering, unity and universality, which are also shared by all international Red Cross and Crescent organizations. TRC has legal personality, and it is subject to private law, and its activities are free of charge. Its organizational structure consists of headquarters and branches. It is important to note that people, who engage in TRC activities in different branches, work voluntarily, but only people in headquarters get salary. In 2016-2010 Strategic Plan of TRC, the current mission is explained as “providing aid for needy and defenseless people in disasters and usual periods as proactive organization, developing cooperation in the society, providing safe blood and decreasing vulnerability”, while its vision is to be an “organization which is taken as a model in Humanitarian aid service in Turkey and in the world; and the organization which is with
people in their hardest time” (TRC, 2016:2). The vision and mission of TRC are the reflections of the new public diplomacy understanding of Turkish government under AK Party rule since 2000s, because strategic planning has gained importance during this time. The regulation of “Financial Management and Control” (No.5018) made strategic planning obligatory for all public institutions. The law entails significant values for public institutions such as performance management, accountability, transparency, financial control, openness and participation, which can increase the responsiveness and effectiveness of these institutions in a global world (Önder & Aydin, 2016; Ayhan and Muhsin, 2016: 59). In its vision, for instance, TRC does not only aim international cooperation, but it also aims to orient international humanitarian diplomacy because it wants to be taken as a model for Red Cross and Crescent societies. In this sense, TRC has now a global mission and vision, because it expanded its activities in the international arena, and it is now one of the largest Red Cross and Crescent organizations which involves in international humanitarian aid activities by its 1.2 million volunteers in 2016 (Huijgh and Warlick, 2016: 26). This organization is an important public diplomacy actor because its activities promote to positive image of Turkey on the eyes of foreign publics and intellectuals.

TRC’s spending has been continuously increasing each year. For instance, the total spending in 2013 was about 500 billion Turkish Liras, while it was about 600 billion Turkish Liras in 2015 in the areas such as culture, social service, human rights, international humanitarian aid, health, education and research (TRC, 2013; TRC, 2015). Depending on the regional developments, The Turkish Red Crescent expands its focus to several regions such as Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Somalia (food crisis), Sri Lanka (tsunami disaster in 2004), Georgia (depending on war with Russia in 2008), Haiti and Chile (earthquakes in 2010) (Huijgh and Warlick, 2016: 26). For instance, TRC established a field hospital where a total of 2892 patients got treatment following the Pakistan earthquake (7.6 magnitude) in 2005, and it also provided support in energy, food, communication, dressing, tent, transport and other necessities (Bozkurt et.al.2006:291). Furthermore, TRC’s engagement in helping thousands of Syrian refugees in several numbers of camps in Turkey contributes to Turkish public diplomacy which is a driving force for soft power. The 2015 statistics shows that there are approximately 1.8 million Syrian refugees who are officially registered, and about 87 per cent of this Syrian population lives in cities, while only 220 thousand of Syrian refugees live in refugee camps in Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Hatay, Adıyaman and Kilis (Yavçan, 2015:7). The number of the refugees is expected to rise, because political crisis still continues in Syria. In order to provide humanitarian aid, education, health and social services for Syrian people in refugee camps, TRC cooperates with Turkish public institutions, International Federation of Red Cross and Crescent (IFRC), United Nations (UN), and the European Union. In this direction, TRC seeks to provide adaptation and integration services, nourishment, child protection (psychological and educational assistance for children between 4-18 ages) and other needs. It also provide social assistance to Syrian refugees, who are living out of camps, in social centers where adult Syrians get support for education, integration, vocational training, and language courses etc. The efforts of Turkey for the refugees and immigrants is taken as an example in the foreign public opinion,

5 Detailed information can be found at TRC website: http://www.kizilay.org.tr/what-we-do/immigration-and-refugee-services
because Turkey hosts more than 2.7 million Syrian refugees in total, and there are 26 refugee camps where all kind of needs of refugees is provided at high standards (Pinna, 2016).

To sum up, TRC is an influential actor at domestic and international levels, because it has a great capacity to shape domestic and international policies in the areas of humanitarian aid, health and social service. It is a global actor responding people in need due to political and social crises, national and international disasters, and food crises. Its increasing activities influences Turkey’s image in a positive way. It is important to note that its development is parallel to new understanding of AK Party government in terms of foreign policy. Although, it is regarded as non-governmental organization, TRC’s activities overlap with government’s interest. The unity of their interests increases the influence of TRC both domestically and internationally.

4. CONCLUSION
This study introduces a country-specific evaluation through the investigation of public diplomacy and soft power in Turkey. Then it takes Turkish Red Crescent as the sample public diplomacy organization contributing to Turkey’s soft power, because it is one of the largest and oldest non-governmental organizations in Turkey. It has become an influential global actor due to increasing capacity in the international humanitarian aid, education, health and social services. Therefore, it plays an essential role in creating a positive image of Turkey in foreign public opinion.

The study tries to discover the following factors; the relation between public diplomacy and soft power; the importance of soft power in international arena; the influences of culture, political values, foreign policies and domestic dynamics on Turkish soft power; the role of Turkish Red Crescent in contributing to Turkey’s image and soft power; the challenges for Turkish public diplomacy institutions abroad.

In this direction, the first part of the study points out that the new understanding of public diplomacy, depended on influencing foreign public opinions by several tools, is a driving force and key element for soft power which gained importance in foreign policies. Until 2000s, Turkey struggled due to social, economic and political crises, but its rapidly growing economy, stability and democratization process since the beginning of 2000s attract the attentions like other emerging powers. Therefore, Turkey also favors public diplomacy as an emerging power, because it seeks to use it as a tool increasing its soft power which helps to practice its foreign policies. In this part, the sources and limitations of soft power are also evaluated. It is claimed that the sources of the soft power are: culture, political values, and foreign policies, and domestic dynamics of a country such as democratization process, stability and socio-economic developments. On the other hand, the limitations on soft power are: excessive dependence on hard, or military, power; the lack of receivers in the foreign public who are expected to accept foreign policies; autocracy where the influence soft power is depended on a dictator as the only decision-maker; focus on national interests rather than specific goals such as peace-keeping or humanitarian aid; governmental control of soft power; and quickly changing opinion polls about soft power depended on annually, monthly or even daily events.
Parallel to increasing importance of public diplomacy organizations (both governmental and non-governmental) and instruments, the second part of the study evaluates the international activities of Turkish Red Crescent in the light of its contribution to the Turkish soft power. Therefore, it is argued that TRC’s capacity has been increasing in the global arena due to its international activities and cooperation with international organizations such as International Federation of Red Cross and Crescent (IFRC), United Nations (UN), and the European Union. TRC is one of the most important public diplomacy organizations in Turkey, because it increases Turkish soft power by creating a very positive image of the country on the eyes of foreign publics due to its international activities in the areas of humanitarian aid, education, social and health services.

In conclusion, most of the governments, in countries considered as (re)emerging and regional power, practice a new understanding of public diplomacy as a key element for their soft power in their foreign policies despite the fact that the soft power issue is firstly discussed through the experiences of the United States. In this sense, Turkey has also favored public diplomacy as a driving force for its soft power during the AK Party rule since 2002. Parallel to AK Party policies, the soft power has become a central issue in foreign policy through influencing foreign public opinions. Therefore, public diplomacy organizations (both governmental and non-governmental), and instruments (film festivals, world fair organizations, TV series, tourism, and higher education etc.) gained more importance depending on their influences on soft power. Moreover, specific studies on the activities and influence of these organizations and instruments can contribute to literature on soft power politics. In this way, these studies can construct a general snapshot of the country from different perspectives, because soft power is a multi-dimensional concept which has several sources and limitations changing as a result of annually, monthly and even daily events in different places.

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